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Since the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) the theoretical microeconomic
approach to tax evasion has almost exclusively treated only personal income tax and, more
recently and with fewer examples, profit taxes (e.g. Kreutzer and Lee, 1986; Lee, 1997,
Yaniv, 1995, Panteghini, 2000). The evasion of indirect taxes, and more precisely of value
added tax (VAT), is an almost unexplored topic for microeconomic theory, and the few
papers that have explicitly treated it from a theoretical perspective (e.g. Marrelli, 1984) have
done so within the production theory framework, i.e. once again as part of a problem of profit
maximization. None of these works analyze those interesting aspects of VAT evasion tied to
the highly social nature of this kind of tax evasion. The social-psychological dimension of tax
evasion is not a new topic, and it has been widely analyzed from both the theoretical (e.g.
Gordon, 1989) and the empirical-experimental perspectives (e.g. Webley, P.Robben, H.,
Elffers, H. and Hessing, D., 1991; Bosco, Mittone, 1997), but once again this literature refers
only to income tax.
The most distinctive characteristic of the evasion of VAT is that it typically involves three
actors – the seller, the buyer and the state – whereas in the evasion of income tax the
interaction concerns only the taxpayer and the state. The interaction among these three agents
may give rise to the following phenomena:
a) the taxpayer, i.e. the buyer of a given good or service, can evade only if s/he is able to
collude with the seller, who should behave as tax collector for the state.
b) The collusion between the seller and the buyer is facilitated by the mutual advantage
accruing to the two agents from the collusion. By colluding, in fact, both agents can
reduce their fiscal burdens: the buyer does not pay the VAT and the seller can declare an
income lower than the real one because s/he under-reports the amount of his/her business,
and consequently must pay less profit tax.
c) The seller can decide to confiscate the tax yield that she has collected from his/her
buyers.
According to point (b) the seller has a double incentive to evade: the first is a market
incentive due to the opportunity to be more competitive by selling at prices lower than the
gross prices (i.e. VAT included) charged by the other sellers; the second is to reduce the
3burden of his/her profit tax by hiding the real volume of his/her business. Note that both these
incentives for collusion (and therefore for evasion) may be nullified if the seller decides to
adopt the strategy described at point (c). For terminological clarity, henceforth I shall define
the seller’s appropriation of the VAT yield collected from his/her clients as “VAT
expropriation”.
A second interesting point related to VAT evasion is that the government may introduce
incentives intended to induce agents to complain, i.e. forms of reward for agents who report
attempts to involve them in collusion. To be effective, the incentives introduced by the state to
encourage the reporting of collusion attempts, by either buyers or sellers, should balance the
just described incentives to collude, and they therefore should be carefully planned. On the
other hand, many national legislatures (Italy’s for example) have serious lawmaking problems
with regard to these kinds of incentive for informing on miscreants. How to incentivize the
denunciation of  collusion attempts will not be treated here, given that it would extend the
discussion beyond the scope of this paper.
A final point investigated here regards risky behavior. In previous experiments carried out
on income tax evasion (Mittone, 1999) an interesting recursive phenomenon was observed in
every experiment: a sort of “bomb crater” effect. The term “bomb crater” is taken from the
practice of soldiers during the First World War to seek refuge in the craters made by  bombs
that had just fallen. The soldiers believed that it was almost impossible for another bomb to
fall in exactly the same place. Similarly, in Mittone (1999) the tax payers evaded immediately
after the fiscal audit even if the probability of being detected was totally independent of
previous tax audits. This phenomenon could be analyzed from the wider perspective of the
learning by doing literature (e.g. Wieland, 2000) or from the more specific viewpoint of the
literature on dynamic tax evasion, e.g. Rickard, Russell and Howroyd, (1982) or Engel and
Hines (1999), respectively on the effects that are produced on the tax payers behavior by the
introduction of retroactive penalties and by retrospective audits.
 Does the more complex environment of VAT evasion produce different effects on the
experimental subjects’ attitude toward risk? Or does the bomb crater effect persist even in the
VAT context?
The approach chosen here to analyze VAT evasion is an experimental one. The main
advantage offered by the experimental approach is that it enables  isolation of each of the
aspects just described and  empirical investigation into the individual roles played by these
factors in influencing VAT evasion.
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The theoretical aspects to be treated before passing to the experimental investigation are
closely related to the solution of questions arising from the just described characteristics of
VAT evasion. These questions are the following:
1) assuming that the sellers operate in some form of imperfect competition market (i.e.
assuming that they can fix their selling price) what is the seller’s optimal price-collusion-
evasion strategy?
2) Which is the optimal collusion-evasion choice for the buyer?
3) Does the traditional tax evasion theory fit with the seller’s decisional problem of keeping
the indirect tax yield collected from his/her buyers?
Although these three questions seem to represent new theoretical topics, more accurate
analysis shows that they are all easily manageable within the framework of the traditional
Alligham-Sandmo model. In fact, unless we introduce into the collusion mechanism some
form of asymmetrical advantage for the agents - for example, some form of reward for the
agent that decides to denounce an attempt at collusion by the other agent - the decisional
problem is very similar to that of income tax evasion.
Both the buyer and the seller can consider VAT evasion from the same perspective of
income tax evasion because VAT reduces the disposable income exactly as income tax does.
The main difference is that the VAT burden is proportional to the price of the good purchased,
while income tax is generally progressively tied to the income level. But this difference does
not alter the ingredients of the tax payer problem, which are the same as originally included in
the classic Allingham-Sandmo model, i.e. the amount of tax due, amount of the fine to pay if
detected, and the probability of being audited.
Another difference between VAT evasion and the traditional theoretical framework of
income tax evasion concerns the sellers only. The expropriation of the VAT yield collected by
the sellers is linked to the decision to evade profit taxes and can therefore be seen as part of
production choices. As anticipated in the introduction, VAT expropriation can be handled
within production theory by looking at the literature on profit tax evasion. This topic will not
be treated here, because the focus of this paper is on collusion between sellers and buyers and
on the effects thus produced on the market dynamic. More precisely, it is assumed here that
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resemble those taken in the income tax environment. This assumption is realistic because the
evasion of VAT mainly arises within transaction contexts where the sellers are very small
firms. In the “real world” when the production unit is made by only one worker-owner its
choices are typically taken using very simple decisional schemes that cannot realistically be
analyzed using the traditional dynamical models of profit-maximization. This is typically the
case of small shops, small building firms and artisan firms e.g. plumbers, painters and so on.
In spite of the apparently traditional setting in which the evasion of indirect taxation should
be framed, this is nevertheless an innovative perspective on the actual behavior adopted by
human actors when confronted with an opportunity to break the law. The interest of indirect
evasion resides in the quite complex psychological context in which it takes place. As said at
the outset, many experiments on the evasion of income tax have shown that the decision to
evade is influenced by psychological factors that may profoundly modify the results of the
decisional process of the taxpayers. These factors, which depend on the social dimension of
the decision to evade income tax, are even more crucial in a context like that of indirect taxes,
where evasion becomes much more explicit than is normally the case in income tax evasion.
Furthermore, the strong psychological impact of indirect tax evasion is a major problem,
not only for the buyer, who must obtain the complicity of the seller to be able to evade, but
also for the seller, when s/he decides to keep the money collected instead of paying it to the
state. In fact, when the seller keeps the money paid as tax, s/he is stealing from both the buyer
and the state, and it is therefore reasonable to suppose that awareness of his/her unfair
behavior will be stronger than in the case of income tax.
On the other hand, and this time with regard to the buyer, one can argue that the subjective
perception of paying a tax is weaker in the case of indirect taxes than it is in the case of
income tax. The relatively weaker psychological perception of the fiscal burden caused by the
indirect taxes may be due to the fact that tax payers generally consider indirect tax to be an
inseparable part of the price that they are paying for a given good. Conversely, in the case of
income tax, tax payers clearly see the amount of money that is being taking away from their
income.
The basic theoretical framework used here is a simplified version of Allingham and
Sandmo’s static model.1 Taxpayers’ choices (by both buyers and sellers) are taken with a
view to the expected monetary value that they can extract from evasion, and every choice is
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 For more detailed description of the theoretical frame see Mittone, 1999.
6independent of previous decisions and subsequent ones. Time independence is ensured by the
following assumption:
H1) the fiscal authority does not take the past behavior of the taxpayers into account when
determining either the fiscal audit probability or the fee to be applied in the case of evasion.
In order to concentrate only on monetary income, it is useful to introduce a further
simplifying assumption:
H2) the agents’ utility depends only on monetary income.
The agents considered here are the buyers and sellers of a given homogeneous good. In
order to keep the analytical framework as simple as possible, further elementary assumptions
must be introduced:
H3) the buyers’ net disposable income (i.e. the income that the buyers can spend to purchase
all the other goods after consumption of the homogenous good) at the end of the
reference period Γ is the difference between the price paid for the good in each purchase
and its reservation price (i.e., Ybuyer =  Σγ RE γ –   Σγ (Pγ +  VAT Pγ) ; with REγ =
reservation price at time γ;   Pγ = price of the good bought at time γ; (γ = 1,…, Γ));
H4) the sellers’ total net income Yseller, computed at the end of a given reference period Γ,
depends exclusively on the total gross profit extracted from each sale minus the profit tax
(i.e., Yseller = ΩnetΓ = (Σγ Pγ  − Σγ CTγ) (1 – t) ; with: ΩnetΓ = total net profit at time Γ; CTγ
= total production costs at time γ; Pγ price of the good sold at time γ; (γ = 1,…, Γ); t =
profit tax rate).
Given these assumptions, one can assume that in each period γ the agents compare the sure
choice, i.e. they do not collude and benefit from a sure profit, if a seller, or pay the VAT and
benefit from a sure net disposable income level if a buyer, with the expected value (9H
obtained respectively from profit tax evasion if a seller and from VAT evasion if a buyer.
More precisely, bearing in mind that the agent has only two choices - to collude or not to
collude - and recalling the time independence assumption, if the agent is a buyer we have:
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where:
pi is the probability that VAT evasion will be discovered;
VAT is the VAT rate;
φ9$7) is the punishment scheme.2
The buyer’s problem, given [2.1], is simply a matter of making a comparison between the
value of H
EX\HU
(9  and the cost of paying the VAT. As well known, in the very special case
when H
EX\HU
(9
 = 9$73 the choice of the buyer is conventionally assumed, by expected utility
theory, to be discriminatory between risk aversion and risk attraction.
Similarly, also the seller’s expected value from collusion can be computed in the following
way:
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where:
ƒ (Ω) is the punishment scheme for the profit tax evasion.
Given 2.2, the decisional problem of the seller is exactly identical to the buyer’s problem,
i.e. it is a matter of comparison between his/her expected value from collusion and the value
of the profit tax that s/he can avoid paying. On the other hand, the decisional task of the seller
is somewhat more complex than the one just described. The seller should in fact consider the
option  of colluding not only as a way to avoid  paying the profit tax, but also as a competition
device. The problem is obviously how to compute the competitive advantage offered by
collusion.
Finally, it is worth noting that the basic decisional frame does not change even when we
allow the seller to expropriate the VAT collected. Also in this case, the problem is that of
comparison between the expected value from expropriation and the sure value of paying the
yield to the state. The main difference in this case is that we can assume that VAT
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 I assume that the penalty rate is imposed on evaded tax, an institutional feature common  to many developed
countries.
8expropriation is no longer a dichotomous variable but that it can be “tuned” by the seller.
Nevertheless, the expected value formula does not change, except for the fact that instead of a
“pay not pay” option we need a “how much to pay” option.
7KHH[SHULPHQWDOGHVLJQ
The context modeled by the experiments discussed here is that of a market of an
homogeneous good with the following features:
1. operating on the market are several sellers and buyers, each characterized by different
reservation values. The reservation value for the buyers is depicted by a reservation
price, while for the sellers the reservation values are represented by their total
production costs;
2. neither the buyers nor the sellers can alter their reservation values;
3. each agent (seller and buyer) can close only one transaction (consisting of only one
unit of the good) per each time period (round of the game);
4. the experiment is carried out using computers; the experimental subjects interact via a
local net;
5. all relevant items of information are given only via the computer screen;
6. each subject receives a role at the beginning of the experiment – seller or buyer –
which does not change throughout the entire experiment;
7. each subject receives an identification number at the beginning of the experiment so
that the subjects’ real identities are not known to each other;
8. each subject receives (via the computer screen) her/his “personal information” i.e.
her/his production cost if s/he is a seller, or her/his reservation price if s/he is a buyer;
this values change over time but the subjects are constantly informed;
9. the money reward for the experimental subjects is given by the difference between the
actual value of the transaction and its cost of production, or its reservation price,
minus the indirect tax;
10. both the sellers and the buyers can make public offers for  the good at the price that
they believe most advantageous: obviously the sellers ask for a price to sell while the
buyers offer a price to buy the good;
911. both the sellers and the buyers can choose to close a contract from the list of offers
shown on the computer screen by left-clicking  on the identification number of the
agent that has offered the price that they believe good for them;
12. the sellers as well as the buyers can try to collude with a potential partner by clicking
on a special button called “collusion” on the screen; when this button is clicked, two
buttons appear on the screen : “yes” and “no”; a subject who receives a proposal for
collusion can accept by clicking on the yes button or can refuse by clicking on the no
button;
13. collusion is always total, i.e. it regards the entire amount of tax due to the state, and it
is a private relationship, so that the other players cannot know if a given seller (or
buyer) has already agreed to collude with someone else;
14. during the experiment a given number of transactions are monitored by the fiscal
authority, and if the subjects have colluded they must pay a fine that will be deducted
from their final rewards;
15. the expected value from collusion (i.e. the values of audit probability and of the fine)
is the same for both the sellers and the buyers;
16. in correspondence to the equilibrium point the lottery is fair, i.e. the expected value
from evasion is equal to the sure choice value;
17. the subjects are informed about the fiscal audit probability and the fine to pay;
18. if the sellers are allowed to expropriate the VAT collected, a special window opens on
the computer screen: the “pay tax yield to the state” window; when the subjects decide
to expropriate VAT, they must write only the amount of money that they have decided
to pay to the government in the window.
At the end of the experiment the subjects are informed about their final money rewards,
which may  amount to a maximum of 50.000 Italian Liras ( just over 25 EURO).
The experiments thus designed are very similar to the seminal Chamberlin (1948)
experiment, to Vernon Smith’s relatively more recent competitive market experiment (1962),
and to the version of these experiments adopted by the Experimental Economics handbook by
Bergstrom and Miller (1997). As in these experiments, use of the neo-classical offer-demand
model of perfect competition permits the forecasting of equilibrium prices without collusion
and with collusion. It is therefore possible to check whether the behaviors of the subjects
conform with the expectations of the model. Furthermore, it  enables investigation of issues
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not strictly related to the economic apparatus anticipated in the introduction. The most
important of these topics is  that of the emergence of reputation mechanisms, i.e. a willingness
to collude that can be interpreted as the commercial “style” of a given subject and which can
be helped or hampered by this reputation.
Nine experiments have been carried out to date at the Computable and Experimental
Economics Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento and at the School of Psychology,
University of Exeter,3 and they have involved a total of 166 experimental subjects:
a) experiment α1 and experiment α2 – base experiments carried out in Trento with 12
experimental subjects each, and  taken as the touchstone for interpretation of the results
from the other experiments;
b) experiment α3 – the same as experiments α1 and α2 but with 24 experimental subjects,
carried out in Trento;
c) experiment β1 – intended to investigate the effects produced by allowing the experimental
subjects, who played the role of sellers, to keep the money collected as indirect taxes
(VAT expropriation in our terminology); 24 experimental subjects were used and the
experiment took place in Trento;
d) experiment αUK1 – pilot experiment (base experiment) carried out in Exeter (GB) to test
whether the experiment can be replicated in other experimental environments; 12
experimental subjects were recruited;
e) experiment α4 – modified base experiment carried out in Trento4 with 24 subjects. The
modification regarded the cadence of change of the reservation values, i.e. the number of
rounds  dividing each change in the reservation values  was reduced from 5 to 2-3
(whether the change was after 2 or 3 rounds was a matter of  random extraction);
f) experiment β2 – modified VAT expropriation experiment carried out in Trento with 24
subjects;
g) experiment αUK2 – modified base experiment carried out in Exeter, 12 subjects, number of
rounds reduced to 20;
h) experiment αSS1 – modified base experiment carried out during the “2001 Summer School
in Experimental Economics”  organized by the CEEL and directed by Daniel Friedman,
22 subjects.
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 The experiments in Exeter  were carried out by Paul Webley.
4
 This modification  was suggested by Paul Webley after the pilot experiment in Exeter.
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The experimental subjects in the experiments carried out in Trento were undergraduate
students recruited by means of announcements on the bulletin board of the Faculty of
Economics.  A similar recruitment procedure  was also  used at Exeter, while for the Summer
School sample we recruited  post-graduate students  at the School itself. Females in all the
experiments,  with the exception  of the Summer School one, made up 50% of the sample.
Each experiment lasted 25 rounds.
The reservation values and the distribution of the reservation values among the subjects for
the experiments with 12 subjects are reported in figures 3.1 and 3.2. The production costs and
the reservation values for the experiments with 24 subjects were obtained by the same values
used for the experiments with 12 subjects multiplied by 2; therefore the curves are identical
but translated towards the right. Thus the equilibrium prices remain the same while the
equilibrium quantities increase.
Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 show that the only effect of including VAT is to increase and broaden the
range of the equilibrium prices.
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To return to the objectives of  the research as described in the previous sections, I was
interested in the following issues:
a) analysis of the equilibrium values dynamic – comparison between the equilibrium values
(predicted by the theory without evasion) and the observed behaviors;
b) analysis of the VAT expropriation phenomenon;
c) the emergence of “notoriety” phenomena, i.e. consumer loyalty towards a given seller
grounded not on a virtuous link but on a collusive mechanism aimed  at evading taxes;
d) testing the “bomb crater” effect observed in the previous experiments on income tax
evasion (Mittone, 1999);
e) searching for successful payoff strategies, i.e. if by looking  at the behaviors observed one
can build a theory of how to improve the payoff.
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To analyze the first two topics, it is useful to plot the equilibrium values (i.e. the average
prices) obtained from the experiments. Figures from 4.1 to 4.6 report the observed average
prices obtained respectively from experiments α1 and α2 (4.1);  from experiments α3 and
β1 (4.2), from experiments α4 and β2 (4.3), from experiments α1 and αUK2 (4.4), from
experiments α3 and α4 (4.5) and from experiments β1 and β2 (4.6).  There are no plots for
experiments αUK1 and for experiment αSS1 because the  former was only a pilot experiment
and therefore the data are not comparable with the data obtained from the other  experiments.
For a similar reason there are no plots for  experiment αSS1 because it was quite different from
the others  (different composition of the sample, different number of subjects) and they are
therefore  not directly comparable.
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 On first glance  at the figures one notes that  all the average prices reported by the
experiments are almost always well approximated by the equilibrium values computed  using
the supply-demand theory (and almost always nearer to the lower bound than to the upper).
The average prices computed for all the rounds in experiments α1, α2, α3, α4, β1,  and αUK2
are respectively: 121.28 Liras (α1);  132.16 Liras (α2); 136.78 (α3); 142.62 (α4); 116.27(β1);
123.55 (β2); 112.50 (αUK2). Similarly, also the experiment carried out using the students  at
the Summer School reports an average price of 102.03, which is the lowest but  still falls
within the interval of the expected equilibrium prices.
 Notwithstanding this general rule of correspondence between the average and the
expected prices,  more  careful analysis of the figures shows some exceptions . Examples of
“anomalous” prices  arise in rounds 12 and 24 of experiment α2, in rounds 1, 3, 14 and 15 of
experiment β ,  in rounds 16 and 23 of experiment α4  and in rounds 18 and 21 of experiment
β2. These anomalous  prices can be explained  by two main reasons: the first is that the errors
are due to some mistake committed by the subjects in  conducting their business, while the
second is the emergence of some form of trend during the experiment.
Examples of mistakes  are the “wrong” average prices5 of both experiment α2 and
experiment α4, while the anomalies registered in the prices of experiments β1 and β2 seemed
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to be the result of a general tendency that pushed the  entire time series down towards the
lowest value of the equilibrium interval. This consideration is grounded on the fact that all the
anomalous prices recorded in both β1 and in β2 always fall below the expected equilibrium
prices and are never  above the highest limit of the equilibrium interval. Furthermore, while
the anomalous prices reported by experiment α2 and experiment α4 represent  something akin
to strong shocks (especially the values reported by experiment  α2) , this is not the case of the
values  for both experiment β1 and β2, which are always quite  close to the general trend.
Final confirmation of the different nature of the anomalies reported respectively in the α2,
α4 and in the β1, β2 experiments is  provided if we look at the total average prices computed
without (by eliminating) the anomalous values. The total average price in experiment α1 and
the total average price in experiment α2 – computed by eliminating the anomalous prices – are
in fact very close (the average prices are respectively 120.7 It. Liras for α1 and 117 for α2),
while the same average prices computed and “cleaned” by eliminating the anomalous prices
for  experiments α3 and β1 (i.e. the 24 subjects experiments) show a  substantial difference
(the average prices are respectively 136 It. Liras for α3 and 101,9 for β1).  Consistently with
this, also the total average price computed by eliminating the anomalous values from the
experiment  α4  comes very close to the value obtained from experiment α3 (the average price
for α4 is 138), while the value computed in the same way for experiment β2 is lower than the
average price of both  α3 and α4 ,  although it is not  particularly close to the average price
computed for β1 (the average “cleaned” price for  β2 is 125).
The results obtained from the experiment  at Exeter are very similar to those already
described for the experiments  carried out in Trento. Fig. 4.4  shows that the observed values
always  fall within the equilibrium interval, and that the general trend is quite similar to the
one  shown by the graph of the experiment α1. The external context (i.e. the  location of the
experiment)  therefore seemed not to  affect the price dynamic.
 Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to obtain  statistical confirmation of the  difference
between the experiments, because one cannot rule out that the individual values are
interrelated; that is, one cannot exclude for  certain that the observations are independent. On
the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that the choices observed during the experiment are
interrelated as a consequence of some learning mechanism  employed by the experimental
                                                                                                                                                                                    
during experiment α2  - experimental subject 6 reported a loss of 400 Italian Liras because s/he bought for 500
Italian Liras a good that for her/him had a value of 100 Liras.
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subjects. Therefore the most common statistical tests used to check whether two samples of
data belong to the same population cannot be used.
 It is also of interest to check  whether the modification  made to the cadence of change of
the reservation values  in experiment α4 and in β2 had any effect on the average prices. This
question  can be answered by looking at figures 4.5 and 4.6,  which plot the trends of α2 and
of α4 and the trends of β1 and of β2.  It appears from the plots  that the trends are very similar,
both for the alpha and for the beta families of experiments.  One  may therefore conclude that
the change in the cadence of the reservation values  had little effect.
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 To summarize the foregoing  discussion  of the  comparison between the trends of the
alpha and the beta experiments, the main result  seems to be that a generalized price reduction
was the  main effect produced by allowing the subjects to expropriate VAT. A possible
explanation for this phenomenon is that the sellers decided to systematically expropriate
VAT, considering this option as a way to reduce their production costs and  thereby engage
in? more “aggressive” price competition. In figs. 4.7 and 4.8, the average VAT expropriation
values per round have been added to the average prices in order to check whether the intuition
just described was correct.
Fig. 4.7 shows  that the VAT expropriation plus price line demonstrates quite clearly that
at least one of the sellers in experiment β1 decided in every round to expropriate the tax yield
collected by her/his buyers. The new line approximates the average price line computed for
experiment α3, and the VAT expropriation plus price level is almost constantly higher that the
average price recorded in experiment α3. On the other hand, it  should be noted that the VAT
expropriation does not modify the average prices dynamic in a way coherent with the “real”
price dynamic of experiment α3.
Considerations quite similar to those just  made  with reference to experiment β1  arise
from fig. 4.8; i.e. by looking at the results from experiment β2. The VAT expropriation plus
price level in experiment β2 is always higher than the β2 line, which means that  in this
experiment, too, at least one player  always expropriated the tax yield. The main difference
between experiment β1 and experiment β2 is that in experiment β2 the amount of VAT
expropriated  was almost always slightly lower than it was in experiment β1 (the average per
round amount of VAT expropriated in experiment β1  was 37.42, while in experiment β2  was
35.73). Another difference is that the average prices of  α3 were often lower than the VAT
expropriation plus prices reported for β1, while the average prices of α4  were lower than the
VAT expropriation plus prices reported for β2 at the beginning of the experiment, but after
round 12 until the end, they become higher.
The differences between experiment β1 and experiment β2  therefore seem negligible and
do not require any further comment.
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The price-VAT expropriation strategy implemented by the sellers in both experiment β1
and in experiment β2 makes  it rather difficult to reach firm conclusions  as to the
psychological constraint that  VAT stealing should produce when it is perceived as  harmful
to the welfare of the other participants in the experiment. In fact, by offering prices lower than
those offered in α3 the sellers  in experiment β1 implicitly shared the advantage provided by
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the opportunity to expropriate the VAT with the buyers. Furthermore, and conversely to the
case of collusion, they alone  run the risk of being punished by the fiscal audit, so that their
behaviour can paradoxically be seen as “altruistic” because they share the advantage offered
by VAT expropriation (through a reduction of the prices) without imposing the risk of paying
a fine. On the other hand, we cannot rule out that this strategy was only a matter of price
competition, and therefore that no psychological complication really arose in conditioning the
decision to expropriate the VAT yield.
6HOOHUV¶UHSXWDWLRQDQGWKH‡ERPEFUDWHU·HIIHFWV
The third and fourth questions raised at the outset concerned the emergence of some form
of sellers’ reputation effect, and the existence of a “bomb crater” effect, also in the VAT
evasion context. The reputation effect can be analyzed by looking at tab 4.3, which
synthesizes the results from all the experiments.
7DE5HSXWDWLRQHIIHFW
PD[RI
‡OLQNDJH·EHWZHHQ
DVHOOHUDQGDEX\HU
QRIVHOOHUVZLWK
‡OLQNDJH·WRDEX\HU

PD[RI
‡OLQNDJH·EHWZHHQ
DEX\HUDQGDVHOOHU
QRIEX\HUVZLWK
‡OLQNDJH·WRDVHOOHU

α1 43,75 4 on 5 46,20 7 on 7
α2 47,06 4 on 5 72,70 7 on 7
α3 27,30 0 on 10 33,30 2 on 14
α4 35,30 2 on 10 45,50 8 on 14
α8. 42,10 4 on 5 61,50 7 on 7
α8. 45,50 4 on 5 50,00 6 on 7
α66 42,90 3 on 9 35,70 3 on 9
β1 33,30 2 on 10 45,50 7 on 14
β 26,10 0 on 10 41,70 6 on 14
The data  should be be read  as follows (e.g. first row):
1st column: 43.75%  of the total number of transactions  performed by seller X were concluded with buyer Y.
2nd column:  of the total number of sellers, 4  out of 5  concluded more than 30% of their transactions with the
same buyer.
3rd column: 46.2%  of the total number of transactions  performed by buyer Z  were concluded with seller W.
4th column:  of the total number of buyers, 7  out of 7  concluded more than 30% of their transactions with the
same seller.
 The results  shown by table 4.3 are  rather difficult to interpret.  On inspecting  the second
and  fourth columns of tab. 4.3, one  might reach the ambiguous conclusion that high levels of
linkage are common in the small-scale  experiments (i.e.  with 12 participants), while they are
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less frequent in the larger-scale  ones ( with 22-24 subjects).  For example, in experiment α1
subject 2 (seller) and subject 7 (buyer) closed 7 contracts out of a total of 16 (43.75 %) closed
by subject 2; and in experiment α2 subject 1 (seller) and subject 7 (buyer) closed 8 contracts
out of a total of 17 (47.06%). Unfortunately, this phenomenon is not particularly relevant
because is obviously related to the absolute number of sellers, and therefore to the  size of the
sample. Paradoxically, one could conclude that the smaller percentages of linkage between
buyers and sellers reported in the 24-subject experiments are not  as small as one  might
expect considering the  larger number ( double) of sellers i.e. the  greater choice for the
buyers.
More in general, the results shown in tab. 4.3  do not seem sufficiently robust to clarify the
role  of collusion as a way to attract  buyers. Collusion proposals as a non-price competition
tool can be better investigated by looking at Tab. 4.4. which reports the number of collusions
proposed and actually  undertaken.
7DE3URSRVDODQGFROOXVLRQ
0D[Q
RIWUDQV
FORVHGE\
DVLQJOH
SOD\HU
$YJQ
RIWUDQV
FORVHGE\
DVLQJOH
SOD\HU
0D[Q
RISURS
GRQHE\
DVLQJOH
SOD\HU
$YJQ
RISURS
GRQHE\
DVLQJOH
SOD\HU
0D[Q
RI
FROOXV
GRQHE\
DVLQJOH
SOD\HU
$YJQ
RI
FROOXV
GRQHE\
DVLQJOH
SOD\HU
3HDUVRQ
FRUU
QSURS
SD\RII
6LJ
WDLOV
3HDUVRQ
FRUU
QFROOXV
SD\RII
6LJ
WDLOV
α1 25 on 25 16.50 12 6.58 6 2.50 -.149* .036 -.075 .295
α2 22 on 25 16.00 12 5.42 7 1.83 -.199** .006 .037 .606
α3 22 on 25 15.76 15 5.66 6 2.00 -.056 .279 -.113* .028
α4 20 on 25 15.08 16 6.46 11 3.42 -.043 .420 -.114* .030
α8. 16 on 20 10.50 14 5.16 4 2.00 -.103 .250 -.106 .240
α66 19 on 25 14.50 19 7.55 8 3.33 -.111 .074 -.053 .397
β1 25 on 25 15.75 19 6.54 10 2.58 -.153** .003 -.058 .259
β 25 on 25 16.50 19 5.29 7 1.83 -.278** .000 -.073 .149
** correlation sig. 0.01
*   correlation sig. 0.05
 It seems from the results shown in tab. 4.4  that there are no  marked differences among
the experiments,  particularly as regards  average values. One interesting  aspect emerging
from tab. 4.4 is that collusion and a proposal  for collusion are negatively correlated with the
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total payoff. This result is coherent with the experimental design, because the penalty system
was –  as in  the real world  –  based on an unfair lottery.  I shall return to the relationship
between the payoff and the game? strategy  in the  next section.
 There is a further question  concerning the collusion proposal : was this device  interpreted
by the experimental subjects as an opportunity for the sellers  or for the buyers? The question
is not trivial one because in the real world (at least in  countries like Italy) collusion  on VAT
evasion  may start with a proposal by either a seller or  a buyer. To investigate  this question,
we may usefully look at table 4.5,  which reports the total  and  average numbers of  collusion
proposals made by  sellers and  buyers respectively.
7DE&ROOXVLRQSURSRVDOV
H[SHULPHQW QSURSRVDO Q QSURSRVDO Q DYJSURS DYJSURS
 EX\HUV EX\HUV VHOOHUV VHOOHUV EX\HUV VHOOHUV
α1 33 7 46 5 4,71 9,20
α2 47 7 18 5 6,71 3,60
α3 75 14 61 10 5,36 6,10
α4 78 14 77 10 5,57 7,70
αSSI 78 9 58 9 8,67 6,44
αUK1 59 7 54 5 8,43 10,80
αUK2 17 7 45 5 2,43 9,00
β1 99 14 58 10 7,07 5,80
β2 87 14 40 10 6,21 4,00
Table 4.4, however, does not give an unequivocal answer to the question about the use of
collusion proposals. In fact, the results  from some of the experiments (e.g. α1, αUK2)  suggest
that  it was mainly sellers  who used  collusion proposals  to attract   buyers; but this result is
completely different from the one obtained from   other experiments (e.g. α2, β2), where the
buyers made more collusion proposals on average than did the sellers.
It therefore seems that  a collusion proposal was interpreted by the experimental subjects
either as a competitive mechanism on the supply side or as a way to save money by evading
VAT on the demand side. It is worth noting that these two different interpretations of
collusion in the experiments seem to show that some form of internal coordination among the
experimental subjects may  take place. In other words, one can hypothesize that the task of
proposing collusion  is mainly a matter of a given role (seller or buyer) in accordance with
some spontaneous selection of behaviors during the first stages of the game. In other words it
seemed that, through some sort of spontaneous coordination at the beginning of the game, the
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players  decided to attribute the role of proposing collusion to the sellers or to the buyers;
thereafter this role remained assigned  until the end of the experiment. This hypothesis  can be
checked by analyzing the initial rounds of each experiment in order to see whether the
dynamic of the collusion proposals follows a different pattern .
 Turning to the “bomb crater” effect, it is  rather difficult to investigate  the attitude toward
risk displayed by the experimental subjects. The difficulty arises mainly from the fact that the
fiscal audits were randomized so that each subject could be audited in different rounds of the
game. On average, when a tax audit  was carried out, 3 to 4 transactions were investigated in
experiments with 12 subjects, and  7 to 8 transactions in  experiments with 24 subjects, which
meant that whenever an audit  was performed about  50-60% of the subjects  were checked.
The aggregated results can therefore be used to test the bomb crater effect, even though one
may expect  it to be less marked than in  the income tax experiments, when all the subjects
were investigated simultaneously (Mittone, 1999). Figure 4.9 shows one of the plots obtained
from the experiments on income tax evasion  for the sake of comparison.  In order to provide
examples of the dynamic of the collusions and of the collusion proposals, figs. 4.10, 4.11,
4.12 and 4.13 report the graphs from experiment α1, α3, β1 and αUK2 respectively.
Fig. 4.9 Experiment on income tax evasion
Tax payments (averages)
Source: Mittone 1999
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Fig. 4.10 Collusions, proposals and fiscal audits
experiment alpha1
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Fig. 4.11  Collusions, proposals and fiscal audits
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Fig. 4.12 Collusions, proposals and fiscal audits
Experiment beta1
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Fig. 4.13 Collusions, proposals and fiscal audits
Experiment alphaUK2
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All the graphs in figs. 4.10; 4.11; 4.12; 4.13 report whether the subjects  were audited
(variable “control”); whether they  proposed collusion (variable “proposal”); and whether they
actually colluded (variable “collusion”). Fig. 4.9 shows the results from one of the income tax
evasion experiments and reports the amount of tax due (variable “tax”), the amount of tax
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actually paid by the subjects (variable “avg. tax paid”), and whether the subjects  were audited
(variable audit).
The bomb crater phenomenon  arose whenever there  was a strong increase in the number
of evasions in the round immediately after a fiscal audit. This effect is very clear and easy to
identify in fig. 4.9. Similarly, the figures  for the VAT evasion experiments  also show that
the bomb crater effect  was always present, albeit with  different degrees of regularity. The
different degrees of magnitude and regularity are obviously due to the fact that the subjects
audited were always different in the VAT evasion experiments. This intuition  can be verified
more effectively by computing two simple indicators:
Indicators CP1 and CP2 allow  comparison among the aggregate behaviors of  the subjects
during rounds  which were not immediately preceded by a fiscal audit (CP1) and during
rounds that followed a fiscal audit (CP2). More precisely, the value of both  indicators is
between 0 and 1. A value of 1 means that the experimental subjects – who  concluded a
transaction - e always made a collusion proposal, a value of 0 means that no subject
suggested  collusion. The results are  given in table 4.6.
7DE&3DQG&3DYHUDJHYDOXHV
H[SHULPHQW &3 &3
α1 0,388 0,433
α2 0,338 0,519
α3 0,355 0,431
α4 0,418 0,453
αSS1 0,502 0,593
αUK1 0,601 0,622
αUK2 0,434 0,472
β1 0,432 0,497
β2 0,314 0,377
 It is evident from tab. 4.6 i that the value of  CP1 is always lower than the value of CP2.
This means that some form of relationship between   a fiscal audit and the decision to try to
no. of collusion proposals out of control
no. transactions out of control
CP1 =
no. of collusion proposals round after control
no. transactions after control
CP2 =
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evade (i.e. to propose a collusion) immediately after the control  emerges in all the
experiments.
0XOWLSOHDQDO\VLV
It was said in the second section  that building a theoretical model of the payoff function
for both the sellers and  buyers is quite trivial. This is because, given the assumptions made
here and the experimental design chosen, the decisional task of the experimental subjects can
be reduced to a classical problem of expected income maximization. In fact the experimental
design used here  eliminates complications  from the patterns of  both the buyers’ and the
sellers’ behavior  because they do  have neither a complex utility function nor a production
function to cope with. The problem for both  agents is therefore simply   that of finding the
best price-collusion strategy. More precisely, they perform a two step process: in the first
stage, they must decide a price, either if they “offer” a price or  if they “accept” a price
suggested by someone else; in the second step, they must decide  on collusion, i.e. they can
“offer” collusion to their partner  or they can “accept”  collusion if their partner “offers” it.
 By inspecting the structure of the decisional process we can therefore distinguish between
two totally opposite styles of behavior:  a wholly passive one and  a wholly active one. The
totally passive style is adopted when the experimental subject decides to wait for the best
price, without offering any price  and in the meantime never offering to collude; the perfectly
active style is adopted when the subject makes  numerous price offers and always offers
collusion. Obviously,  one can then imagine many different intermediate game styles  between
these two extreme behaviors. It  should be noted that  being “passive” does not mean not
closing contracts. On the contrary, a passive player  may be more efficient in closing contracts
because s/he is more concentrated on the prices offered and therefore faster to accept the best
price (in other words s/he is faster in clicking on a good price ) than the “active” players, who
are diverted by the task  of offering prices.
 Returning to the model of the payoff strategy, we can therefore imagine that the degree of
success is related to the game style  chosen by the experimental subject. A first attempt to
model the game style  is the following:
Y = f(Su, Tr, Op, Ro) [5.1]
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Where:
Su = percentage of successful  collusion proposals
Tr = number of transactions  concluded
Op = number of price offers
Ro = role of the player (dichotomous variable: 0 = buyer; 1 = seller)
Time is another important element that  may influence the degree of success (the payoff
level) of a game strategy . The speed of choice, i.e. how fast  a player is in clicking a price
and closing a contract, can influence the amount of money that s/he  earns in the end. More
precisely, a player should be fast in clicking the best price when it appears on the computer
screen but  at the same time patient enough to wait for it. It is worth noting that a hasty player
will generally close her/his contracts quickly but in this way  may make bad bargains, in a
similar but opposite way,  an overly contemplative player  may miss a chance to close a good
contract  and thereby increase her/his final payoff. The new payoff model to test is therefore
the following:
Y = f(Su, Tr, Op, Ro, Ti) [5.2]
Where  Ti = number of seconds between the beginning of the round and the choice of a price
by the player.
 [5.1] and  [5.2]  show that the behavior of the subjects described by the model is  entirely
unaffected by the probability  of being inspected, and fined if found guilty of VAT evasion.
The model must therefore be improved by including some measure of the fiscal audit
probability perceived by the experimental subjects. From the analysis of the results on the
bomb crater effect we know that the subjects  were strongly influenced by the real experience
of an audit. Hence, a good way  of approximating the perceived audit probability is to include
in the model  the number of audits carried out during the experiment. The assumption  behind
the introduction of this variable is that  agents are in some way influenced by the direct
experience of  a fiscal audit. The final model is therefore the following:
Y = f(Su, Tr, Ro, Op , Ti, Co) [5.3]
Where Co = number of fiscal audits (controls)
The econometric analysis  was restricted to experiments α1; α2;  α3;  α4  and β1;  β2 . The
databases  were constructed by summing the values of the variables during the 25 rounds  for
29
each player and aggregating the results from the alpha and the beta experiments. Therefore
two databases  were used: the first one (alpha)  consisted of  72 cases,  and the second  of  48
cases. The results obtained from the more extended model [5.3] estimated using the alpha data
set are summarized in table 5.1.
7DEOH5HJUHVVLRQUHVXOWVDOSKDGDWDVHWPRGHO>@
0RGHO>@VXPPDU\
R R-square Adjusted
R-square
Std. Error
of the
estimate
.827 .684 .655 344.8096
Independent variables: (Constant), success of collusion proposals, seconds, fiscal audits, price
offers, role, transactions
$129$
Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig.
Regression 16709103.240 6 2784850.540 23.423 .000
Residual 7728087.371 65 118893.652
Total 24437190.611 71
a)  Independent variables: (Constant), success of collusion proposals, seconds, fiscal audits,
price offers, role, transactions
b)  Dependent variable: Y –  Payoff
&RHIILFLHQWV
Unstandardized
coefficients
Standardized
coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. error Beta
(Constant) 1587.417 346.585 4.580 .000
Tr – transactions -29.061 20.103 -.181 -1.446 .153
Co – fiscal audits -25.520 44.595 -.052 -.572 .569
Ro – role -1089.716 124.524 -.922 -8.751 .000
Op – price offers 4.594E-02 1.076 .003 .043 .966
Ti – seconds 3.355 1.433 .169 2.342 .022
Su – success of
collusion
proposals
6.804 168.581 .003 .040 .968
Su – success of
collusion
proposals
6.804 168.581 .003 .040 .968
Dependent variable: Y – Payoff
On inspecting the statistical results obtained from the OLS regression carried out using the
alpha data set,  one notes that the overall quality of the model [5.3] is good. The regression
explains  just under 70% (0.68) of the variance of the dependent variable, and the F test
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allows rejection of the null hypothesis of no linear relationship between the payoff and the
independent variables.
The statistics for the variables in the equation allow  the size of the model to be reduced by
eliminating three variables  which do not significantly influence  the dependent variable. The
variables to be eliminated are: the fiscal audits, the price offers and the success of collusion
proposals. The results for the new model are reported in tab. 5.2.
7DEOH5HJUHVVLRQUHVXOWVDOSKDGDWDVHWPRGHO>@VLPSOLILHG
6LPSOLILHGPRGHO>@VXPPDU\
R R-square Adjusted
R-square
Std. Error
of the
estimate
.826 .682 .668 337.9712
a  Independent variables: (Constant), seconds, transactions, role
$129$
Sum of
squares
df Mean square F Sig.
Regression 16669922.914 3 5556640.971 48.647 .000
Residual 7767267.697 68 114224.525
Total 24437190.611 71
a)  Independent variables: (Constant), seconds, transactions, role
b)  Dependent variable: Y – Payoff
&RHIILFLHQWV
Unstandardized
coefficients
Standardized
coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. error Beta
(Constant) 1595.905 319.502 4.995 .000
Tr – transactions -34.518 16.036 -.215 -2.153 .035
Ro – role -1091.574 119.431 -.924 -9.140 .000
Ti – seconds 3.402 1.379 .171 2.467 .016
Dependent variable: Y – Payoff
The overall statistical quality of the simplified model is very good, and all the independent
variables are significant in explaining the payoff. The signs of the independent variables  yield
two quite interesting pieces of information: the first  is that is more profitable to be a seller
than to be a buyer (remember that the Ro variable was a dummy with 0=seller and 1=buyer),
while the second  is that none of the signs of the two continuous independent variables is
coherent with the assumptions made.  A large number of transactions are negatively
31
correlated with the payoff, which means that  numerous transactions  were  concluded at a
“bad” price for one or both the contracting agents. This result is reinforced by the negative
sign of the variable  measuring the  speed in clicking on a price. The lower  this speed, the
greater the payoff, which means that players  who close their contracts too rapidly often  miss
better opportunities that  arise later in  the round. It therefore seems that the winning strategy
was the “passive” one: i.e. the highest payoffs  were obtained by the players  who chose to
conclude a few good  transactions, patiently waiting for the best price.
On running the regression using the beta data base, the results are quite similar to those
obtained from the alpha data set. Table 5.3 reports the statistical results obtained by using
model [5.3].
7DEOH5HJUHVVLRQUHVXOWVEHWDGDWDVHWPRGHO>@
0RGHO>@VXPPDU\
R R-square Adjusted
R-square
Std. Error
of the
estimate
.751 .564 .500 320.0308
Independent variables: (Constant), success of collusion proposals, fiscal audits, price offers,
role, seconds, transactions
$129$
Sum of
squares
df Mean square F Sig.
Regression 5436757.322 6 906126.220 8.847 .000
Residual 4199208.657 41 102419.723
Total 9635965.979 47
a)  Independent variables: (Constant), success of collusion proposals, fiscal audits, price
offers, role, seconds, transactions
b)  Dependent variable: Y – Payoff
&RHIILFLHQWV
Unstandardized
coefficients
Standardized
coefficients
t Sig.
B Std.
error
Beta
(Constant) 2305.858 331.006 6.966 .000
Tr –  transactions -66.227 18.579 -.608 -3.565 .001
Co – fiscal audits -51.289 46.685 -.159 -1.099 .278
Ro – role -865.978 130.886 -.953 -6.616 .000
Op – price offers 2.869 2.128 .178 1.348 .185
Ti – seconds -1.666 1.969 -.109 -.846 .402
Su – success of
collusion
proposals
-68.851 160.147 -.045 -.430 .670
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Dependent variable: Y – Payoff
The main differences between the results from the alpha and beta data sets are a lower R
square and the fact that the variable  measuring rapidity in choosing a price (Ti) is no  longer
significant in explaining the dependent. The sign of the dependent variables  linearly
correlated with the payoff (i.e. Tr and Ro)  are of the same sign as observed in the alpha
experiments This result reinforces  the above remark about  interpretation of the regression
run using the data of the alpha experiments.
 Further information on the role played by the independent variables can be obtained by
running a regression tree with the extended model (i.e. model [5.3]). The results of the
regression tree for the alpha data set are reported in fig. 5.1, while the results for the beta data
set are reported in fig. 5.2.
)LJ5HJUHVVLRQWUHHDOSKDGDWDVHW
Fig. 5.1  shows that the most  influential variable is role, and it  confirms that the sellers
have better chances  of obtaining a higher reward than the buyers . In fact when the value of
the variable Ro is lower than 0.5, and the number of price offers is  less than 29.5, the players
always gain a payoff  greater than the average payoff, while if Ro is  above 0.5 the payoff is
lower than the average payoff. As Ro is a dichotomous variable with 0 = sellers and 1 =
buyers, it follows that the sellers always  achieve higher-than-average payoffs, while the
Ro < 0.5
Op < 35.5
Over
Over
Under
Op < 42.5
Su < 0.47
Under Under
Op < 29.5
Over
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buyers receive a payoff  above the average only when the total number of price offers is
between 35.5 and 42.5 and the percentage of successful collusion proposals  is greater than
47%.
)LJ5HJUHVVLRQWUHHEHWDGDWDVHW
It emerges from the second regression tree (fig. 5.2) that, for the beta data set, the role of
seller does not always ensure  a payoff  above the average. In fact, the sellers  are able to
finish the game with a payoff  higher – but not always – than the average only when the total
number of transactions is  less than 21.5. On the other hand, in the beta data set also the
buyers can  achieve a higher-than-average payoff  – while this was never the case for the
buyers in the alpha experiments – but only when they  perform a total number of transactions
which is  less than 11.5. The importance of the negative sign of the relationship between
payoff and number of transactions is therefore confirmed  by a new discovery: the rule of
higher payoffs with few transactions is even stricter for  buyers than for  sellers.
Two general conclusions can be drawn from the regression analysis. The first  is that the
design of the experiment  induces many players to play too  rapidly, and this phenomenon
indubitably has some effect on the price level; the second  is that the players do not fully
understand that VAT evasion in a context like the one designed here does not pay. This latter
point is the more  important one, and it follows from the fact that variable Su (success of
collusion proposals) has no effect on the level of the payoff .  Because the dynamic of
collusion proposals does not decrease during the experiments, it is clear that the  subjects
were  unable to  handle this variable correctly in their strategies.
Over
Ro < 0.5
Tr < 21.5 Tr < 12.5
Under
Over Under
Su < 0.13Tr < 11.5
Under Under
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&RQFOXVLRQVEDFNWRWKHUHDOZRUOG
The first and more interesting result that emerges from the experiments carried out is that
the opportunity to expropriate VAT produces noticeable effects on the equilibrium prices and
is seen by both the sellers and the buyers as an opportunity to modify their bargaining
strategies. More precisely, when the sellers  are able to expropriate the VAT, the price level is
lower than it is in the absence of VAT expropriation. A more effective fiscal audit system,
one able to reduce  opportunities for VAT expropriation, should therefore produce not only  –
as is obvious – an increase in the tax yield but also an increase in the price level. An increase
in the price level is not a trivial consequence for a fiscal policy, and it  may prove to be
undesirable in a more general economic policy context.
The second  significant result is that  individual choices  concerning collusion and risk may
differ greatly from subject to subject. At the same time, however,  it seems that some form of
social consensus (at least on who  should suggest collusion)  arises spontaneously in the
artificial societies  created for the experiments. This result, too, should have important
consequences on  fiscal policies, because it aids refinement of measures to  combat VAT
evasion. A good example of different approaches towards the rules  regulating VAT payment
is provided by the British and  Italian systems. In the British fiscal system,  only sellers  must
pay VAT  , while  buyers have no formal  obligation to do so: if the sellers do not apply VAT.
they are not guilty of anything. In the Italian system, by contrast,  responsibility is shared
between  sellers and  buyers.  Obviously, “spontaneous” mechanisms of collusion proposal
like those observed during the experiments can only arise in systems like the Italian one. In
British-style  systems, the spontaneous  onset of collusion proposals can only start from the
sellers, who  alone assume the risk  of being fined.
The most important  finding that emerges from  analysis of the payoff strategy is that the
experimental subjects tend to over-evaluate the importance of  VAT collusion, using it even if
it does not influence the final level of the payoff. From this point of view it seems that  no
learning process  takes place in the subjects,  who seem locked into a  relatively rigid strategy
which they do not revise even when it  is obviously unsatisfactory.
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